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Abstract
This essay fills a gap by exploring compliance theory in international
law to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. After introducing the topic
and setting the context, it delves into the question of why nations follow
international law. Interacting with prominent theoretical models (including
the managerial model, fairness and legitimacy, transnational legal process,
self-interest, and a comparative perspective with Europe), it arrives at a
critical synthesis in the conclusion.
Member State Compliance with the Judgments of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights in its Inception Phase
Non-compliance with the judgments of a court, considered the serious
offence of "contempt of court" here in the United States, can carry serious
penalties, especially criminal contempt of court.1 In the case of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights,2 hereinafter called the IACHR, the
1

18 USCS §401 (2005); see also Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958);
Rebecca Yoheved Starr, Twenty-Eighth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:
Authority of the Trial Judge, 87 GEO. L.J. 1590 (1999).
2
“The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the sole judicial organ in the
Inter-American human rights system. As such, it is the final arbiter of human rights in
those American States that have ratified the American Convention on Human Rights.”
JO M. PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (2003); see also Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights 76 A.I.J.L 231 (1982). Since the Inter-American system of Human
Rights was created, the creation of a judicial organ was a vital necessity. See CARLOS
GARCIA BAUER, LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN AMERICA [The Human Rights in
America] (1987). “The Court’s purpose is specifically defined as the application and
interpretation of the Convention. In carrying out its purpose the Court exercises both
an adjudicatory and advisory jurisdiction.” SCOTT DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1992); see also Jo M. Pasqualucci, Advisory Practice of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Contributing to the Evolution of
International Human Rights Law 38 STAN. J INT’L L. 241 (2002). For more
information on the advisory jurisdiction, see MANUEL E. VENTURA ROBLES & DANIEL
ZOVATTO, LA FUNCION CONSULTIVA DE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS
HUMANOS: NATURALEZA Y PRINCIPIOS [ THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERAMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: NATURE AND PRINCIPLES] (1982-1987). For
more information about the operation of the Human Rights Court, see Antonio
Augusto Cancado Trindade, The Operation of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS (David J. Harris &
Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998). For a detailed history of the Inter-American Court of
Human Right, see also Víctor Rodríguez Rescia & Marc David Seitles, The
Development of the Inter-American Human Rights System: A Historical Perspective
and a Modern-Day Critique 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 593 (2000); LA CORTE
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sequellae seem less overt yet nonetheless maintain a sizable influence.3 One
might ask how a court such as the IACHR, given its lack of police or armed
forces to enforce its orders, could possibly have a high rate of compliance
from sovereign states. Yet at least at a certain level, the Court has had a very
high level of compliance.4
It can be argued, as Prof. Douglass Cassel at Northwestern University
School of Law does, that the Court has only had one and a half full-blown,
defiant responses.5 He writes especially about the Peru crisis6 (but also
mentions Trinidad and Tobago)7 in "Peru Withdraws from the Court: Will the
Inter-American Human Rights System Meet the Challenge?"8
Cassel first lays out a foundational paradox found in the InterAmerican system of human rights:9 the IACHR is at the zenith of its
INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS [The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights] (1986); The Inter-American Court of Justice, at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/
(last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
3
There are less overt but nonetheless real and perceived consequences for not
complying: they can come in diplomatic, economic, political and social dimensions,
for examples.
4
While the Court has eventually received compliance with its reparation orders,
it has had difficulty in getting State compliance with orders for States to press
criminal prosecution in their domestic systems.
5
Douglass Cassel, Peru Withdraws from the Court: Will the Inter-American
Human rights System meet the Challenge? 20 HUM. RTS. L.J. 167, 167-168 (1999).
6
“The interaction between Peru and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(Court) over the last few years has spawned a series of pathbreaking events. The
Court issued unprecedented remedial judgments in cases that were brought against
Peru under the American Convention of Human Rights and that arose out of the
conviction and sentencing of civilians in military tribunals by so-called faceless
judges pursuant to emergency decree laws on terrorism and treason. For the first time
in its history, the Court ordered a state to release a prisoner, to nullify judgments of its
courts and to reform its domestic laws.” Bernard H. Oxman & Karen C. Sokol,
International Decision: Ivcher Bronstein Human Rights—Law of treaties –
Jurisdiction of Inter-American Court of Human Rights—Effect of Attempted
Withdrawal of Jurisdiction, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 178 (2001).
7
Trinidad and Tobago, which had been a State Party, denounced the American
Convention on May 26, 1998, effective May 26, 1999. PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, supra note 2; see also Richard J. Wilson & Jan Perlin, The
Inter-American Human Rights System: Activities from Late 2000 Through October
2002, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 651 (2003).
8
Cassel, supra note 5, at 167; see also Karen C. Sokol, Human Rights-laws of
Treaties-Jurisdiction of Inter-American Court of Human Rights-Effect of Attempted
Withdrawal of Jurisdiction, 95 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 178-185 (2001). Sokol writes about
the path-breaking nature of the interactions between Peru and the IACHR.
9
“The inter-American human rights system is composed of a series of
international documents. The principal human rights tools include: the American
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acceptance as well as the exercise of its broad formal powers yet it contends
with a relative paucity of diplomatic support.10 This divide came to the
forefront during the crisis of Peru's attempted withdrawal from the Court.11
Peru, which through former President Fujimori (who fled the country
in October 200012) had tried to openly defy the Court,13 has since formally reentered its place within the Court's jurisdiction.14 Ivcher,15 who had lost his
Convention on Human Rights, and its accompanying protocols; the Additional
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights; and the Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty. In addition, three regional inter-American
conventions seek to broaden the scope of protected human rights: the Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture; the Inter-American Convention on Forced
Disappearance of Persons; and the Inter-American Convention for the Prevention,
Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women.” Rescia & Seitles, supra
note 2; see also DAVIDSON, supra note 2; TOM FARER, THE RISE OF THE INTERAMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME: NO LONGER A UNICORN, NOT YET AN OX, THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1998); Jo. M. Pasqualucci, Victim
Reparations in the Inter-American Human Rights System: A Critical Assesssment of
Current practice and procedure, 18 MICH J. INT’L L. 19 (1996).
10
Supra note 5, at 167; see, e.g., Financial Situation of the Court, 1997-1998
INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 31, OAS/Ser. L/III.29, doc. 5 (1998).
11
Cassell, supra note 10. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was
informed by the Peruvian Embassy in Costa Rica that Peru adopted Legislative
Resolution No. 27401 on January 18th, 2001. This Resolution charges the Executive
Branch to do everything necessary to re-establish the State of Peru under the
contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/PRENSA/2001/cp_2_esp.htm] (last visited 2003).
12
“A popular uprising in the year 2000 forced Fujimori to flee to Japan, where he
was seeking protection as a national, so as not to stand trial for multiple human rights
violations” Sonia Picado, The Evolution of Democray and Human Rights in Latin
America: A Ten Year Perspective No. 3, HUM. RTS. BRIEF 28 (2004).
13
“Peru made history by becoming the first state to deposit its withdrawal from
the Court's jurisdiction without denouncing the American Convention. The Court
deemed the withdrawal ineffective: even though states may ratify the American
Convention before or without ever accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court,
once they do accept that jurisdiction, they may denounce it only through denunciation
of the Convention as a whole.” Peru may therefore not return to the status quo ante;
once committed to the American Convention and the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court, it is both or none. Oxman & Sokol, supra note 6.
14
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/PRENSA/2001/cp_4_esp.htm
4 (last visited Sept. 2003). The Ivcher Bronstein case, Interpretation of the Judgment
on the Merits: Art. 67 American Convention on Human Rights, Judgment of
September 4, INTER-AM. CT. H.R., (ser. c), No. 84 (2001), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/84-ing.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
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During this session, the Court delivered on the 6th of February. The Court decided
unanimously:
1. to declare that the State violated the right to a nationality found in Article
20.1 and 20.3 of the American Convention of Human rights against Baruch
Ivcher Bronstein.
2. to declare that the State violated the judicial rights in Article 8.1 and 8.2 of
the American Convention of Human Rights against Baruch Ivcher Bronstein.
3. to declare that the State violated the right to judicial protection found in
Article 25.1 of the American Convention of Human Rights against Baruch
Ivcher Bronstein.
4. to declare that the State violated the right to private property found in
Articles 21.1 and 21.2 of the American Convention of Human Rights against
Baruch Ivcher Bronstein.
5. to declare that the State violated the right of free expression found in Articles
13.1 and 13.3 of the American Convention of Human Rights against Baruch
Ivcher Bronstein.
6. to declare that the State did not meet its general obligation in Article 1.1 of
the American Convention of Human Rights in connection with the violations
of substantive rights spoken of in the previous resolution points prior to this
Sentence.
7. that the State ought to investigate the deeds which generated the violations
established in the present Sentence in order to identify and sanction the ones
responsible for them.
8. that the State ought to facilitate the conditions for Baruch Ivcher Bronstein
would be able recover the use and enjoyment of his rights as the majority
owner of his Latin American Company as it was before August 1, 1997
according to the terms of the domestic legislation. Domestic law applies to
the compensation pertaining to the dividends as the majority shareholder.
For all of this, the respective requests ought to be submitted to the
competent, national authorities.
9. The State ought to pay in equity Baruch Ivcher Bronstein an indemnization
of $20,000.00 or its equivalent in Peruvian currency to effectuate the
payment of moral damages.
10. In equity, the State ought to pay Baruch Ivcher Bronstein the sum of
$50,000.00 U.S. dollars or its Peruvian equivalent to make him whole for the
costs related to the domestic as well as international litigation.
11. The Court would supervise the execution of the Sentence until the closing of
the case.
On March 14th, 2001, the Court decided the following in regards to the Ivcher
Bronstein case:
1. To lift the provisional measures ordered by the Court in its resolutions of
November 21st and 23rd, 2000 in favor of Baruch Ivcher Bronstein, his wife,
Neomy Even de Ivcher, and their daughters Dafna Ivcher Even, Michal
Ivcher Even, Tal Ivcher Even and Hadaz Ivcher Even as well as Ms. Rosario
Lam Torres and Julio Sotelo Casanova, Jose Arrieta Matos, Emilio
Rodriguez Larra?, Fernando Via? Villa, Menachem Ivcher Bronstein y
Roger Gonzalez.
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To communicate the present Resolution to the State and to the InterAmerican Commission.
3. To archive the legal proceedings relative to the provisional measures in this
case. Tribunal Constitucional de Peru at http://www.tc.gob.pe/ (last visited
February 18th, 2005).
[again unofficial paraphrase/translation of official material on the Court's web
page] The Inter-American Court of Human Rights in San Jose, Costa Rica in its
sessions from January 29th to February 9th, 2001, decided the following matters:
1. The Constitutional Court case. During the time of these sessions, the Court
delivered this sentence on January 31st:
Unanimously,
1. to declare that the State violated judicial guarantees found in Article
8 of the Convention against Manuel Aguirre Roca, Guillermo Rey
Terry y Delia Revoredo Marsano.
2. to declare that the State violated the right to judicial protection
found in Article 25 of the Convention against Manuel Aguirre
Roca, Guillermo Rey Terry y Delia Revoredo Marsano.
3. to declare that the State did not fulfill its general obligation under
Article 1.1 of the Convention with respect to the violations of the
substantive rights in the previous resolution points in this Sentence.
4. that the State ought to order an investigation to determine the
responsible parties in the human rights violations that were done in
the matters pertaining to this Sentence in order to reveal the results
of this investigation and punish those responsible.
5. that the State ought to pay the amounts corresponding with the
salaries in conformity with the legislation to Manuel Aguirre Roca,
Guillermo Rey Terry y Delia Revoredo Marsano, in agreement with
what was established in paragraphs 121 and 128 of this Sentence.
6. In equity, that the State ought to pay the costs of the victims of the
present case in accordance with paragraphs 126 and 128 of this
sentence the following amounts: to Mr. Manuel Aguirre Roca
US$25,000.00 or its Peruvian equivalent at the time of effectuating
the payment; to Mr. Guillermo Rey Terry US$25,000.00 or its
Peruvian equivalent at the time of effectuating the payment; and
Mr. Delia Revoredo Marsano US$35,000.00 at the time of
effectuating the payment.
7. that the Court would supervise the completion of the Sentence until
the conclusion of the case.
The Constitutional Court case Provisional Measures on March 14th, 2001, the
Court resolved:
1. To lift the provisional measures ordered by the Court in its
Resolution of August 14th, 2000 for Delia Revoredo Marsano.
2. To communicate the present Resolution to the State of Peru and to
the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.
3. To archive the legal proceedings.
15
See Oxman & Sokol, supra note 6.
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television station, has had his station restored to him.16 The Peruvian
Constitutional Court Justices17 ousted by former President Fujimori have been
reinstated.18 The Court can count itself the victor through the Peruvian crisis.19
Trinidad and Tobago,20 which withdrew over capital punishment
cases,21 has rejoined (with reservations) the community of Latin American
16

See Wilson & Perlin, supra note 7.
See Interpretation of the Judgment on the Merits: Art. 67 American
Convention on Human Rights, Judgment of September 4, supra note 18.
18
Jurisdiction, Resoluciones y Sentencias, Series C, No. 55 (2000), available
at http://corteidh oea.nu.or.cr/ci/PUBLICAC/SERIE_C/C_55_ESP.HTM (March 7,
2005); see also Interpretation of the Judgment on the Merits: Art. 67 American
Convention on Human Rights, Judgment of September 4, supra note 18, “While
Ivcher was struggling to regain his citizenship and his rights in the television station,
President Alberto Fujimori, serving his second term, was endeavoring to overcome
the limitations of Peru's 1993 Constitution, which prohibits a president from serving
more than two consecutive terms. Fujimori's first term began in 1990, three years
before the Constitution came into effect. In 1996, the Peruvian Congress enacted a
statute that interpreted the term limitation as inapplicable to presidential terms that
began prior to the approval of the Constitution. Three of the seven justices (with two
abstentions) on Peru's Constitutional Tribunal (Tribunal Constitutional) invalidated
the new statute, however, as it 'applied to the specific case of the incumbent
President's candidacy for the office of President in the year 2000,' thereby threatening
to frustrate Fujimori's ambitions for a third presidential term. Four months later, the
Congress impeached the three justices and then voted in favor of removing them
from the Constitutional Tribunal. Pursuant to a petition filed by a number of Peruvian
congressional deputies, the Commission issued a report finding that Peru had violated
the justices' rights to a fair trial, as well as the right of all Peruvians to an independent
and impartial justice system. The Commission recommended that Peru reinstate the
justices, but Peru failed to comply or to reach a friendly settlement after negotiations
with the petitioners. The Commission then submitted the case to the Court.” See also
Oxman & Sokol, supra note 6.
19
For more details about the Peruvian crisis, see ANA SALADO OSUNA, LOS
CASOS PERUANOS ANTE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS
[PERU’ S CASES BEFORE THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS] (2004).
20
Wilson & Perlin, supra note 7.
21
“During 2001 and 2002, the Court decided both the admissibility and merits of
a collection of death penalty cases from Trinidad and Tobago (‘Trinidad’). The Court
first considered Trinidad's preliminary objections in three separate cases, the Hilaire
Case, the Benjamin et al. Case, and the Constantine et al. Case. The cases were later
consolidated for disposition on the merits and reparations under the name Hilaire,
Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago. All of these cases present
complex issues of treaty application and treaty reservations, arising from Trinidad's
aggressive efforts to defend its death penalty regime. Because of its desire to speed up
executions, Trinidad withdrew its ratification of the Convention on May 26, 1999,
one year after its announced intention to do so. The Commission and Court
nonetheless continue to apply the Convention to all pending cases that arose when the
Convention was in effect” Id.
17
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nations under the jurisdiction of the Court. So the Court has prevailed
through the one and a half outright challenges against it, both with Peru as
well as Trinidad and Tobago.22
As of yet, no one has assessed the general state of compliance to the
IACHR.23 This article aims to start filling this gap in the scholarly literature.
It also seeks to provide some theoretical grounding to compliance with
international law, why the Court has received the degree of compliance it has
had, as well as theory based clues to how the Court might gain greater
compliance and influence24—since its work plays a critical role in bringing
greater justice to this hemisphere.25
Background and Foundation
A brief background of the Inter-American human rights system helps
to set the stage for understanding the history, practice and procedure of the
Inter-American court, which in turn gives context to the issue of
compliance.26
The Court was installed in Costa Rica through a series of acts starting
from September 3, 1979 in the National Theater of San Jose. The National
Theatre, appropriately enough, was the location where the American

22

Interview with Professor Douglass Cassel, Northwestern University School of
Law (Feb. 8, 2001).
23
Id.; also see Mark W. Janis, The Efficacy of Strasbourg Law, 15 CONN. J. OF
INT'L L. 39 (2000). Janis notes gaps in the compliance literature for the European
system. There seem to be appreciably more gaps in the existing Inter-American
human rights system literature.
24
“Evaluating accomplishments and prospects in the area of international human
rights law recalls the oft-used rhetorical question about whether the glass is half
empty or half full. As far as human rights are concerned, if the question is 'how much
has been achieved,' the answer must be 'a great deal.' If the question is 'how much
remains to be achieved,' the answer will be the same: 'a great deal.' This statement
made by Thomas Buergenthal about the accomplishment of international human
rights in general could be applied to the Inter-American system of Human Rights.
Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights Law and Institutions;
Accomplishments and Prospects, 63 WASH L. REV. 1 (1988); see also, Michael F.
Cosgrove, Protecting the Protector: Preventing the Decline of the Inter-American
System for the Protection of Human Rights, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’ L L. 39 (2000).
25
See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & DOUGLASS CASSEL, EL FUTURO DEL SISTEMA
INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCION DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS [THE FUTURE OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS] INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (1998).
26
See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & DINAH SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE AMERICAS: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed., 1995).
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Convention (with which the Court is supposed to adjudicate) had been drafted
close to a decade earlier.27
The Convention entered into force on July 18, 1978 when Grenada
deposited its instrument of ratification to the Convention. Grenada acted as
the pivotal eleventh member state of the OAS to do so.28 On May 22, 1979,
the States Parties to the Convention elected seven judges to serve as the
original Inter-American Court of Human Rights.29
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the sole judicial organ
in the Inter-American human rights system. As such, it is the final arbiter of
human rights in those American States that have ratified the American
Convention on Human Rights. As of January 2003, twenty-four of the thirtyfive Member States of the OAS are State Parties to the American
Convention.30
During its early years, the Court’s prospects for improving the human
rights of the people of the Americas appeared uninspiring. Dictators in the
Western Hemisphere perpetrated gross and systematic violations of human
rights. State-sponsored forced disappearances, extra-judicial killings, and
torture were commonplace. The court’s principal vehicle for contributing to
international law during that period was its advisory opinions.31
When the Commission began to refer contentious cases to the Court,
and the Court pronounced violations of human rights, it shocked the
governments of newly emerging democracies. These States equated the need
for human rights enforcement with peremptory power, not unlike the prior
caudillos. Some feared that States would refuse to participate in proceedings
before the court, a recurring problem before the International Court of Justice
at that time. This fear proved largely unfounded. States responded to
27

Installation of the Court, 1980-1983 INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 9, OEA/ser.
L/V/III.3, doc. 13 corr. 1 (1980).
28
Entry into Force of the American Convention, 1980-1983 INTER-AM. CT. H.R.
7, OEA/ser. L/V/III.3, doc. 13 corr. 1 (1980).
29
Their names and nationalities are as follows: Thomas Buergenthal (United
States), Máximo Cisneros Sanchez (Peru), Huntley Eugene Munroe (Jamaica), Cesar
Ordonez Quintero (Colombia), Rodolfo Piza Escalante (Costa Rica), Carlos Roberto
Reina Idiaquez (Honduras), M. Rafael Urquia (El Salvador).
30
“These states are Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname,
Uruguay and Venezuela. Trinidad and Tobago, which had been a State Party,
denounced the American Convention on 26 May 1998, effective 26 May 1999.”
PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 2.
31
Id.
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applications filed against them by designating agents, filing memoranda, and
appearing and arguing at public hearings. To be sure, States often filed
preliminary objections, many of which were frivolous; however, when the
Court denied these objections, the states presented their defenses.
The reputation of the Inter-American Court increased as a result of
the quality of its jurisprudence.32 The status of the Court is reflected in the
status of State witnesses who have appeared before it to defend State actions.
For example, in The Baena Ricardo Case, in which 270 former State
employees alleged that they were illegally dismissed from their jobs as a
result of an ex post facto law, Guillermo Endara, the former president of
Panama, and his vice-president testified before the Court. 33 in which 270
former State employees alleged that they were illegally dismissed from their
jobs as a result of an ex post facto law, Guillermo Endara, the former
president of Panama, and his vice-president testified before the Court.
Eventually, some States accepted responsibility for the human rights
violations before the Court reached a judgment--leaving only the issue of
reparations to be decided.34 The acceptance of international responsibility on
the part of the State indirectly acknowledged that an Inter-American Court
judgment attributing responsibility to a State for human rights violations
would be taken seriously—both domestically and internationally.35
State compliance with Court-ordered reparations has similarly moved
forward. As the Court has no coercive mechanisms in and of itself to enforce
judgments, some thought that States would simply ignore them and refuse to
make Court-ordered reparations to the victims. Honduras, under the
presidency of Carlos Roberto Reina, a former Inter-American Court judge,
eventually paid the compensation ordered by the Court. Most other States
have also paid pecuniary compensation ordered by the Court, although many
have balked and delayed payment for extensive periods.
32

For criteria referring cases to the Court, see Claudio Grossman, President’s
Inaugural Session Speech at the 95th Regular Meeting of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1115 (1998).
33
Baena Ricardo et al. (270 Workers v. Panama): Merits, Inter-Am. Court H.R.,
Series C, No. 72, ¶ 65(h)-(i) (2001).
34
“Cases in which States have accepted international responsibility include
Barrios Altos (Chumbipuma Aguirre et al v Peru) (Merits), Case 75, Inter-Am
C.H.R., para 31 ser.c, doc. 75. (2001); Aloeboetoe et al v Suriname (Merits), InterAm. C.H.R., para 22, ser.c, doc. 11(1991); El Amparo v Venezuela (Merits), InterAm. C.H.R., para 19, ser c, doc. 19 (1995); Garrido and Baigorria v Argentina
(Merits), Inter-Am C.H.R., para 25, ser. c, doc. 26, (1996); Del Caracazo v Venezuela
(Merits), Inter-Am C.H.R, para 37, ser c, doc. 58 (1999). Las Palmeras v Colombia
(Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R., para 19, ser c, doc. 90 (2001) accepting partial
responsibility.” PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE , supra note 2 at 8.
35
PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE , supra note 2.
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Redress extends beyond compensation alone. The Court may also
order the State to take actions or to desist from particular acts. When Peru
complied with the Court’s order to release from prison Maria Elena Loayza
Tamayo,36 a college professor, it marked a new level of State compliance.37
Upon the Court's order, Peru also later released Cesti Hurtado from prison.38
Subsequently, in certain cases when the Court has declared a
domestic law or judgment to be in violation of the American Convention,
States have amended the laws,39 domestic courts have declared them
unconstitutional,40 or domestic court judgments have been annulled.41 These
developments exalt Inter-American human rights law to supranational stature.
There exists, however, another level of State compliance with Court
orders not yet commonly observed in the Inter-American system. The Court,
in almost every case, orders the State to investigate, prosecute and punish the
individuals responsible for the human rights violations. These orders seldom
find fulfillment. In most cases, impunity reigns, and the State power structure
lacks the means or the will to bring the perpetrators of human rights violations
to justice. Some day, if and when the States regularly follow Court orders to
prosecute and punish the violators, the Court will have contributed
substantially to the fall of impunity and to the specific and general deterrence
of human rights violations in this hemisphere.42
The initial apprehension that the member states would withdraw their
acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction or denounce the American Convention
has not generally met with reality. Only one State, Trinidad and Tobago, has
denounced the Convention and the Court’s jurisdiction, but it later returned
with reservations.43 Peru, which had announced its intention to withdraw its
36

See Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R. para 5, 84, ser. c, doc.
33 (1997).
37
PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 2.
38
Cesti Hurtado v. Peru (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 29
September 1999) Inter-Am. C.H.R., order of 19, ser. c, doc. 62 (1999).
39
Cantoral Benavides v Peru (Reparations), Inter-Am. C.H.R., para 76, ser c,
doc. 88 (2001).
40
Suarez Rosero v. Ecuador (Reparations) (Art.63 (1), American Convention of
Human Rights), Inter-Am. C.H.R., para 76, ser c, doc. 88 (2001); PASQUALUCCI,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 2.
41
Cesti Hurtado v. Peru (Reparations) Inter-Am. C.H.R., para 15, ser. c, doc. 78,
(2001).
42
PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 2.
43
See Natasha Parassran Concepcion, The Legal Implications of Trinidad &
Tobago’s Withdrawal from the American Convention on Human Rights, 16 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 847 (2001).
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recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction, has since reaffirmed its acceptance of
the Court's jurisdiction. Moreover, additional States beyond the original
member states have both ratified the Convention, and accepted the Court’s
jurisdiction.44
Agreement for the Court's Establishment and its Impact Towards
Compliance
The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Costa
Rica and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights established the legal
context in which the Court operates within its host country.45 Some of the
portions of this agreement have a direct or indirect impact on our topic at
hand.
• Article 1 provides that the IACHR is "autonomous."46
• Article 3 helps the Court to build a community of law. 47
• Article 5 provides that the Court will enjoy the immunities and
privileges in the "Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the
Organization of American States.”48 This article expressly takes "into
account the importance and independence of the Court."49
• Article 6 protects the premises and archives of the Court from
interference by any government search, seizure or interference.
Given the sensitive nature of rulings against national governments, this
safeguard helps embolden the Court by making its archives and premises
inviolate.50

44

See Press Release, Peruvian Legislative Resolution No. 271532, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., CP2/01, at http://corteidh.or.cr. (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
45
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 1980-1983 INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 16, 17 OEA/
ser. L/III.5, doc. 13 (1981) [hereinafter, Costa Rica Agreement].
46
This is important because such a body must ideally be independent of the type
of political pressure that could distort its judgment.
47
It provides that the Court may enter into agreements of cooperation with law
schools, bar associations, domestic courts, and research institutions dealing with
human rights so that the Court can strengthen the principles of the Convention and the
Court itself. Id. at 18.
48
Id. at 17.
49
Again, this independence is crucial for establishing the impartiality of the
Court. This official acknowledgment of the importance of the Court, while possibly
viewed as token, is nonetheless an official pronouncement by the Government of the
Republic of Costa Rica, the host country of the Court. Especially during this
formative period of the Court, such an official endorsement by Costa Rica could only
be seen as a boon towards greater recognition and legitimacy, which aid in
compliance. Id. at 17.
50
Id. at 18-19.
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Financial protection is also built into the agreement. Article 7 forbids
taxes on the Court with the exception of charges for public utility services. It
also bars the imposition of customs, duties or charges for official use by the
Court. It specifically protects the Court's publications from any such customs,
duties or charges. This Article prevents retaliatory charges from being placed
on the Court. Economic pressure in these forms is thus forbidden by the
agreement. In this way, the Court is protected from some illicit attempts at
swaying or intimidating it by attacking its figurative pocketbook. Such a
measure increases the Court's financial independence. 51
Article 8 further protects the Court's pocketbook by permitting the
Court to operate accounts in any currency, hold funds in a foreign currency,
transfer funds between countries, and convert currency without financial
controls, regulations or moratoria of any kind. This monetary authorization
without the burden of financial controls, regulations or moratoria would be
important, for example, when there are monetary reparations to handle. If
these protections were not in place, a country ordered to pay reparations could
impose regulations that would in effect circumvent the payment of the
reparation.52 In this same vein, any judicial or administrative process,
according to Article 9, cannot touch the Court, its assets, income and other
property. This immunity includes not being subject to domestic courts unless
the IACHR expressly waives its immunity in a particular case. Article 9 thus
gives the Court the liberty to judge without being judged itself by other
courts.53
The Court also has what is known as a "total franking privilege."
What this means is that the IACHR does not have to pay for postage on its
mail. Furthermore, the Court enjoys favorable treatment of its official
communications at the level of diplomatic missions as to the rates, taxes,
press rates, and priorities for its communications. These Article 10 privileges
come with insulation against censorship of its correspondence and other
official communications of the Court. The Court may even use codes to relay
messages secretly. These measures at once prevent interference with the
Court's communications as well as help facilitate these communications.54
After Article 10 begin Chapters III-IX, which largely deal with the
privileges and immunities of the Court and those who appear before the
Court. These privileges include the granting of travel documents such as visas
or diplomatic passports. Also, the immunities and privileges for judges are
grounded minimally in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
51

Id. at 19.
Id. at 17.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 20.
52
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which Costa Rica ratified. Chapter IV, Article 14 extends the same
immunities and privileges to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the Court
with the exception that they shall not be granted the category of chiefs of
mission. Staff receive the privileges and immunities found in the Agreement
on Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of American States of May
15, 1949 as well as any other treaties in force. Chapter IX, Article 26 c)
grants immunity for persons appearing before the Court from all
administrative or judicial proceedings during their stay in Costa Rica, unless
the Court waives this immunity out of necessity. Victims and claimants alike
have the same immunities and privileges.55
Chapter XI, Article 28 provides that Costa Rica will continue to
subsidize the Court annually in an amount not less than its initial grant, which
is recorded in the Law of the General Budget of the Republic of Costa Rica.56
For an introductory overview of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
one would do well to read "A United States View of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights."57
Compliance Theory
Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter provide factors pertaining
to what they refer to as supranational adjudication in their rigorous and
informative article, "Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication."58 While their immediate application is to the European Court
of Justice (ECJ),59 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)60 and the
55

Id. at 20-25.
Id. at 26.
57
Douglass Cassel, A United States View of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, in THE MODERN WORLD OF HUMAN RIGHTS/ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THOMAS
BUERGENTHAL, 209 (1996). It covers the Court's first 15 years while giving an
American professor's view on why the U.S. might consider accepting the Court's
contentious jurisdiction.
58
Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J., 273 (1997).
59
European Court of Justice, at http://europa.eu.int/institutions/court/ (last visited
Mar. 7, 2005).
60
“In the European Court of Human Rights, individuals can sue states-parties to
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [ECHR]. Just
about every western and eastern European State (including Russia) is a state-party to
the European Convention. As in the Inter-American system, private individuals and
corporations cannot be sued. States, however, can be sued for failure to prevent
foreseeable gross human rights violations committed by private persons. Furthermore,
corporations can - and often do - sue states-parties. Only in dicta has the European
Court recognized that shareholders can sue in exceptional circumstances. The
European Court provides monetary damages, legal fees and costs awards; however, it
does not provide injunctive relief and has not provided punitive damages. Another
56
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United Nations Human Rights Committee,61 they explicitly state how their
"checklist" of factors could be applied to other international62 (or
supranational/aspiring towards supranational status) bodies.63 These factors
aspect of the adequacy of these international tribunal systems concerns the time it
takes for the case to reach its conclusion. Assuming that the case is found admissible
and the tribunal reaches the merits and damages award stage, the proceedings can last
anywhere from two to ten years, depending on the case's complexity and the tribunal's
interest in a particular case. The Inter-American system will generally take longer
because of its lack of financial and staff resources and each case's two-stage process
of going through both the Commission and Court. On the other hand, in addition to
having more money and a larger staff, cases before the European Court do not have to
go through a commission. The Inter-American system however, does have friendly
dispute resolution mechanisms built into it that expedite the resolution of cases.
Unfortunately, the European system no longer appears to have such a strong, friendly
dispute resolution mechanism in place, as the old European Commission of Human
Rights was dismantled a few years ago.” Francisco Forrest Martin, The International
Human Rights & Ethical Aspects of the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine, 35 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 101 (2003); See The European Court of Human Rights, at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2005); Luis Ignacio Sanchez Rodriguez,
The American and European Human Rights’ System, LA CORTE Y EL SISTEMA
INTERAMERICANOS DE DERECHOS HUMANOS [The Court and the Inter-American
System of Human Rights] (1994), at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (last visited Feb. 18,
2005).
61
“The United Nations Human Rights Committee was established to monitor the
implementation of the Covenant and the Protocols to the Covenant in the territory of
States parties. It is composed of 18 independent experts who are persons of high
moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights. The
Committee convenes three times a year for sessions of three weeks' duration,
normally in March at United Nations headquarters in New York and in July and
November at the United Nations Office in Geneva.” United Nations Human Rights
Committee, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/a/introhrc.htm (last visited Mar.
6, 2005).
62
"The term ‘international tribunal’ is referenced in a number of United States
statutes. From these statutory obligations, as interpreted, one can discern a workable
definition for international tribunals as: an objective and impartial adjudicative body
established by or with the imprimatur of two or more governments with the power to
make a binding decision as to law or facts. This definition falls between the two
extremes, rejecting a litmus test that excludes many international adjudicative bodies
that do not meet certain artificial categories, but is not so broad as to embrace the
whole panoply of potential candidate institutions.” Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts,
International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 675
(2003).
63
“By definition, in a supranational body there is no democratically-legitimate
hierarchical superior, as we understand that notion in a national sense. Rather, there
are at best indirect political controls exercised by national executives over otherwiseautonomous supranational technocratic agents who owe their loyalty to the
membership of the supranational body as a whole rather than to any one particular
state.” Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of
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have not been applied as an aggregate, as far as I know, in relation to the
Inter-American system of human rights.64
What are these factors? Helfer and Slaughter divide up the factors
into three main categories:
1. Factors within the control of states party to an agreement establishing
a supranational tribunal;
2. factors within the control of the judiciary; and
3. factors often beyond the control of states or judges.65
Within the first category of factors within the control of states party to the
agreement for a supranational tribunal's formation, they note four factors in
descending order of importance:
1. composition of the tribunal;
2. caseload or functional capacity of the court;
3. independent fact-finding capacity; and
4. formal authority or status as law of the instrument that the tribunal is
charged with interpreting and applying.66
Under factors within the control of the judiciary, this article finds the
following factors the most important:
• awareness of audience;
• neutrality and demonstrated autonomy from political interests;
• incrementalism;
• quality of legal reasoning;
• judicial cross-fertilization and dialogue; and
• the form of opinions.67
The third cluster of factors is the one that fits into neither of the first
two, broad categories. The three that this article notes are:
1. the nature of the violations;
2. autonomous domestic institutions committed to the rule of law and
responsive to citizen interests; and
3. the relative cultural and political homogeneity of states subject to a
supranational tribunal.68

Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628
(1999).
64
Wilson & Perlin, supra note 7; Christina M. Cerna, The Inter-American System
for the Protection of Human Rights, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 195 (2004); Pasqualucci, supra
note 2; Michael F. Cosgrove, supra note 24.
65
Helfer & Slaughter supra note 58.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
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It would be interesting to interact with these factors in reference to what the
IACHR has done69 and what it can yet do.70 The Slaughter/ Helfer model can
aid in analysis.
While the IACHR has its own particular characteristics, it does draw
significantly from the European bodies.71 The IACHR derives some of its
substance (in the American Convention72) from the same stream that is found
in Europe.73 The IACHR even receives funding from the European Union74
and European Union countries.
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?
Louis Henkin states that "almost all nations observe almost all
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of
69

See Manuel E. Ventura Robles, La Corte Interamericana de Derechos
Humanos: Camino hacia un Tribunal Permanente, [The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights: The Way Towards a Permanent Court], in LA CORTE
INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS [The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights] (1986).
70
See Augusto Cancado Trindade & Manuel E. Ventura Robles, El Futuro de la
Corte InterAmericana de Derechos Humanos [The Future of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights] (2003). To contemplate where the Inter-American system is
at, and what direction it can go, see also Brenda Cossman, Reform, Revolution, or
Retrenchment? International Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era, 32 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 339 (1991).
71
European Court, supra note 59.
72
The American Convention of Human Rights (American Convention), signed in
1969, incorporated the Commission and assigned it specified specific powers under
the Convention. It also created the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (InterAmerican Court). The American Convention entered into force in 1978. See the
American Convention of Human Rights, at
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention (February 18th, 2005); NIETO
NAVIA, INTRODUCCIÓN AL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCIÓN A LOS
DERECHOS HUMANOS [Introduction to the Inter-American System of Human Rights]
(1993).
73
As regards regional human rights systems, “three systems are in existence
today, one in Europe, one in the Americas, and the third, in Africa. The European
system is the oldest of the three and is generally considered to be the most effective.
The institutional structure established by the American Convention is modeled on that
of the European Convention. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and
the Inter-American Court have functions similar to those of their European
counterparts” Buergenthal, supra note 24, at 15. For a comparison between the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, see
Martin, supra note 60.
74
See European Union, at http://europa.eu.int (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION

336

[Vol. 33:3

the time" (emphasis omitted).75 This assertion finds corroboration in a host of
studies?76
Andrew T. Guzman notes that, “for years international law
scholarship generally assumed that nations tend to comply with international
law.”77 Yet some scholars contrarily claim that noncompliance is common.
Tragically, the assumption of compliance may most contradict the reality in
the realm of international human rights. Despite the great increase in human
rights instruments since World War II, noncompliance remains more common
than one might expect.78 In the IACHR, however, compliance (at least on
some levels) has stayed the norm with noncompliance the exception.
The Managerial Model
The New Sovereignty, a crowning work by Professor Abram Chayes
of Harvard Law School and former Legal Adviser to the U.S. State
Department, together with Antonia Handler Chayes, who served as former
Undersecretary of the U.S. Air Force, contend that a "managerial model" best
accounts for compliance with international law within treaty regimes,79 such
as the one placing countries under the jurisdiction of the IACHR.80
“According to the Chayes, treaty compliance also derives from the need to
maintain one's status within a highly interrelated community of states.”81 The
Chayes state, "[T]he fundamental instrument for maintaining compliance with
treaties at an acceptable level is an iterative process of discourse among the
parties, the treaty organization, and the wider public."82 This is in
contradistinction to the view that the looming threat of sanctions coerces
75

LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979), quoted in Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997);
see also David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 879 (2003).
76
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? YALE L.J.
2599 (1997). In footnote 2 Koh cites a long string of studies along these lines.
77
See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1826 (2002); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Treaties Make a Difference?
Human Rights Treaties and the Problem of Compliance, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1937
(2002).
78
See Moore, supra note75.
79
According to David Moore, "none of these approaches, however, offers a
comprehensive description of compliance with international law in general or human
rights in particular. To name some of the more apparent shortcomings in his view, the
Chayes’s managerial model assumes a tendency to comply rather than explaining
compliance." Id.
80
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS, 3 (1995).
81
Moore, supra note 76.
82
Id.
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countries to follow the treaty regime. This observation seems to fit well with
the compliance in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights--because the
Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly has yet to
administer sanctions upon any member state.83 Thus, the threat of sanctions is
apparently not a live threat, which makes it implausible as the impetus for
compliance with the judgments of the IACHR.
Fairness and Legitimacy
New York University Law Professor Thomas Franck avers that the
fairness of the international rules themselves constitutes the linchpin of
compliance in his book Fairness in International Law and Institutions.84
Franck speaks of nations bowing to international law even without the hatchet
of formal enforcement over their heads in consideration of right process
(legitimacy) and distributive justice.85 These notions at their best tie into the
foundational discussion that preceded this section. Much of Franck's own
philosophical foundations can be found in his book, The Power of Legitimacy
among Nations (1990).86
Transnational Legal Process
Harold Koh,87 who serves as the Dean of Yale Law School and
formerly as an Associate Secretary of State, adopts a view of transnational
83

See Organization of American States, at
http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=../../documents/eng/structure.asp
(last visited Mar. 9, 2005), which gives the structure of the General Assembly of the
OAS.
84
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
(1995). Franck's 1993 Hague Lectures in Public International Law provided a
foundation from which to work.
85
Susan Sturm provides an overview of the literature on judicial legitimacy.
Judicial legitimacy is more crucial for the IACHR because it does not have coercive
measures at its disposal to compel compliance Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory
of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355 (1991); see also Scott C. Idleman, A
Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995). Scott identifies
three factors that have an impact on judicial legitimacy. These factors are: 1)
unanimity or near unanimity in decisions; 2) professional civility in opinions; 3) and
continuity of the law over time. The IACHR often meets the unanimity or near
unanimity in decisions factor, seems to be a model of professional civility and
decorum, and is still relatively young, which does not allow extensive continuity of
the law over time.
86
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
87
“Harold Koh has argued that nations comply with international law as a result
of repeated participation in transnational legal interactions with state and non-state
actors which leads to internalization of international norms and the formation of
national identity around those norms.” See Moore, supra note 75.
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legal process, which is the "complex process of institutional interaction
whereby global norms are not just debated and interpreted, but ultimately
internalized by domestic legal systems."88 Koh acknowledges value in the
works of the Chayes and Franck but deems them inadequate.89
Koh sees a massive sea change in the international law scene. The
nature of this change includes:
1. an erosion of national sovereignty;
2. a multiplying of international regimes, institutions and non-state
actors;
3. a blurring of the public-private distinction (in international law;
4. the rapid formation of customary and treaty-based rules;
5. the increasing interpenetration of international systems and domestic
ones.90
Are these traits characteristic of the Western Hemisphere where the
Inter-American system holds sway? To track Koh's list:
1) state sovereignty seems to persist more in the Western
Hemisphere than it does in places like Europe;
2) the formation of the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights,91 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,92 the
88

Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 76, at 2602; see also
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996).
89
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 76.
90
Id. at 2604.
91
“The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (Commission) was created
in 1959 to serve as a mechanism for overseeing national implementation of such
human rights commitments. Composed of seven members elected in their individual
capacity, the Commission started operating in 1960 with a vague mandate. In 1965,
its competence was expanded to accept communications, request information from
governments, and make recommendations "with the objective of bringing about more
effective observance of human rights."In 1967, the OAS Charter was amended, and
the Commission became a principal organ of the OAS. The Commission has three
forms of jurisdiction. Its conventional jurisdiction applies to the states that have
become parties to the American Convention. Its judicial invocative jurisdiction
provides the competence to invoke the Inter-American Court; it applies to the stateparties to the American Convention that have accepted the Inter-American Court's
jurisdiction. While these two forms of jurisdiction depend upon adherence to the
American Convention, the Commission's declaration jurisdiction applies to all parties
to the OAS Charter, indeed, to all states in the Americas. Hence, every independent
state in the Western Hemisphere, even those which have not yet become party to the
American Convention, is subject, in some form, to the Commission's jurisdiction. The
Commission's jurisdiction may be invoked by citizens and organizations within the
hemisphere.” Michael Reisman, Practical Matters for consideration in the
establishment of a Regional Human Rights Mechanism: Lessons from the InterAmerican experience, ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 89, (1995); see also,
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American Convention of Human Rights,93 the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),94 MercoSur,95
the Organization of American States96 itself and other
examples seem to show a multiplication of international
regimes and institutions.97 Nonstate actors like Center for
Justice and International Law (CEJIL),98 Amnesty
International,99 Human Rights Watch,100 the Centers for
International Human Rights at Universities like American
University, University of Notre Dame, Northwestern
University and others have multiplied as well.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, at http://www.cidh.org/ (last visited Feb.
18, 2005).
92
See Reisman supra, note 91.
93
Id.
94
“The North American Free Trade Agreement is ‘preeminently’ a trade
agreement .Its main purpose is the establishment of a free trade zone between Canada,
Mexico and the United States. The agreement enumerates its objectives as the
elimination of trade barriers with respect to goods and services; the furthering of
conditions of fair competition; the extension of investment possibilities; the protection
of intellectual property rights; the creation of effective procedures concerning its
implementation, application, joint administration, and dispute settlement; and the setup of a framework for further cooperation.” Patrick Specht, The Dispute Settlement
Systems of the WTO and NAFTA: Analysis and Comparison, 27 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L 57 (1998).
95
The Common Market of the South (Mercado Comun del Sur) was created by
the Treaty of Asuncion signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in 1991.
Chile and Bolivia became associate members in 1996 and 1997, respectively. This is
the most important international commitment among these countries. See Mercosur,
at http://www.mercosur.org.uy (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
96
The Organization of American States (OAS) is a pioneer of modern human
rights law. The OAS Charter of 1948 incorporates the "fundamental rights of the
individual" as one of the Organization's founding principles. See The Organization of
American States, at http://www.oas.org/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2005); see also THOMAS
BUERGENTHAL, ROBERT NORRIS & DINAH SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE AMERICAS: SELECTED PROBLEMS, (3d ed. rev., 1990).
97
Id.
98
The Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) is a non-governmental,
non-profit organization with consultative status before the Organization of American
States (OAS), the United Nations (UN). A central component of the work of the
organization is the defense of human rights before the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights ("the Commission") and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
("the Court”). See Center for Justice and International Law, at http://www.cejil.org/
(last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
99
See Amnesty International, at http://www.amnesty.org/ (last visited Mar. 6,
2005).
100
See Human Rights Watch, at http://www.hrw.org/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
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3) Private companies are becoming increasingly concerned
about human rights and other such areas traditionally deemed
to be within the realm of public, international law.101
4) Some of the examples under 2) above illustrate the formation
of customary and treaty based rules. For the purposes of this
article, the American Convention of Human Rights is the
most pertinent example.102
5) The work of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
powerfully illustrates the inter-penetration of international
and domestic systems in at least several ways:
• the obligation of nations to change their laws to be in
conformity with a judgment of the court;
• the fact that those in the executive branches of
domestic governments are often charged with
carrying out the Court's ruling;
• that domestic judicial and investigatory bodies have
been ordered by the Court to continue investigations
or judicial proceedings;
• the judgments of the Court are sometimes reported on
by domestic media channels.
So the changes in the international scene in general are largely found in the
Western Hemisphere, the Inter-American system of human rights providing
the key example. This analysis helps to map the matrix of compliance.
Self-Interest
Some scholars try to root compliance in self-interest: “Jack
Goldsmith and Eric Posner have rejected the notion that nations feel a sense
of obligation to obey international law and have treated compliance as an
ephemeral result of the convergence of a nation’s interest with the tenets of
the law.”103 The immediate financial cost of complying with the judgments
would tend to cut against this view. However, the longer-term interests such
as reputation, trade, and international relations could factor in favor of this
view. Along these lines, Moore states that:
Respecting human rights tend to impose immediate costsrestraints on governments power or the costs of providing
opportunities. Violating human rights provides, from the
governments’s perspective, the immediate benefits of
unrestrained action, while risking future costs, such as stunted
101

Many observers have noted this trend, including Judge Delissa Ridgeway of
the Court of International Trade. Judge Delissa Ridgeway address, ABA Panel on
International Law at the ABA National Conference (August 4, 2001).
102
See Ridgeway, supra note 101.
103
See Moore, supra note 75.

2005]

MORSE TAN

341

economic growth. Complying with human rights thus
demonstrates a willingness to restrain present use of power
for long-term benefits, while violating human rights preserves
the full range of governments' power in the present at the
expense of future gains.104
In this sense, Jo M. Pasqualucci refers to the informal effectiveness of
the Inter-American Court in the sense that in repeated instances, referral of a
case to the Court, or the Court's scheduling of a public hearing has brought
about positive action within the state involved.105
A Comparison with Europe
For a comparative analysis, Mark W. Janis, who holds the William F.
Starr Professorship at the University of Connecticut, writes about the
effectiveness of the European system.106 He breaks down his study of
compliance into three categories: 1) judgments (and decisions), 2) legal rules,
and 3) the legal system itself.107 He surveys the literature in these categories
with prodigious footnotes.108
Janis suggests four possible tests for legitimacy, which he deems as
"the most crucial 'practical' test for the efficacy of the Strasbourg legal
system."109 These tests are:
1) the case load in the European Court of Human Rights,
104

Id.
“The referral of a case to an international court focuses international attention
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2) the acceptance of what were the two optional clauses of the
European Convention,
3) the growth in the number of states joining the Council of
Europe and ratifying the Convention,110 and
4) an increasing recognition of the legitimacy of the system.111
Janis concludes by noting the impressive level of compliance and gives a call
to further studies on this heretofore high level of compliance (by international
law standards) with Strasbourg law.112
Parallel analysis of the Inter-American system of human rights
reveals:
1) a dramatically increased and increasing case load in the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights;
2) broad acceptance and ratification of the American
Convention of Human Rights with few reservations;
3) acceptance of the jurisdiction of the IACHR by the crush of
Latin American countries. The English speaking countries
like the U.S.A., Canada, and the English speaking Caribbean
countries are exceptions in the hemisphere. With the
acceptance of Mexico and Brazil, it is essentially a solid mass
of countries under the Court's jurisdiction from Mexico
through Central America down to the bottom of South
America;
4) and an increasing recognition of the legitimacy of the system,
even by Peru, which had previously posed the most serious
challenge to the Court.113
110
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Conclusion
Over twenty years ago, international human rights law was not taken
very seriously. It was considered to be "soft law". However, over the years,
there have been dozens of cases before the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights114 and thousands of cases in which the European Court of Human
Rights115 have found states in violation of their international legal obligations
with respect to human rights. Of those many rulings, only a few states have
refused or been slow to comply with these Courts' orders. There is little doubt
that now international human rights law is "hard law," i.e., effective law in
many respects. Therefore, international human rights fora generally are both
available, and provide remedies to violations of human rights with which
states often comply.
Professor Douglass Cassel, the Director of the Center for
International Human Rights at Northwestern University School of Law, has
looked more at state compliance with international law in the Inter-American
system than just about any other legal scholar.116 The judgments of the
IACHR are considered "hard law" as they are legally binding.117 Cassel notes
that:
States have been more apt to comply with judgments and
orders of the Court than with resolutions of the Commission.
However, they do so in part because the Court, unlike the
Commission, is a judicial body, and is also the second and
final instance in the process, whereas the Commission is the
first. Greater compliance with Court orders, then, is due not
only to the distinction between soft and hard law, but to the
113
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differing nature of the promulgating institutions and their
decision making processes.118
Cassel brings together legitimacy's "compliance pull" from Prof.
Franck, the Chayes' "iterative process of discourse", as well as Koh's
"transnational legal process" as mutually compatible theoretical
frameworks for viewing the Inter-American system.119 All of these things
point to a culture of compliance, an informal ideological regime—ideas
akin to what Helfer and Slaughter put forth.120 To be a member in good
standing of the informal "Latin American Club" so to say, a state would
do well to comply with the judgments of the IACHR, at least cosmetically
if not substantively.121 Otherwise, tacit but starkly understood
repercussions follow from the other members of the "Club."122
Similar statements can be made about the Inter-American system. Up
to the present, compliance has been rather impressive in regards to financial
reparations: yet room for improvement exists with orders to States to
prosecute such crimes in their domestic systems.
At present, much room yet exists for many further studies of
compliance in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This study comes
as a single salvo in what could be a steady stream of scholarship on
compliance in the Inter-American system yet to come. May it encourage
further analysis on this vitally important part of the pursuit of justice in this
hemisphere!
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